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ABSTRACT
We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal
financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show
that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output.
More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater
aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not
excluded from the market.
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The ability to attract external ﬁnancing is crucial for the creation of new
ﬁrms and the expansion of existing ones. For that reason the nature of the
ﬁnancial arrangements between investors and entrepreneurs has important
consequences for the growth of ﬁrms. One important issue in ﬁnancial con-
tracting is enforceability, that is, the ability of each side to repudiate the
contract. This is especially important because projects often involve speciﬁc
entrepreneurial expertise and might be worth less to investors without the
services of managers who initiated them. At the same time the development
of such projects may provide managers with experience that is extremely
valuable for starting new projects.
Contractual arrangements that are motivated by limited enforceability
are most likely to be important for ﬁrms that are small, young and invest in
assets that cannot be used as collateral. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997)
have shown that these considerations can help to explain some of the growth
characteristics of small and young ﬁrms. We know for example that smaller
and younger ﬁrms are less likely to distribute dividends and that, conditional
on the initial size, they tend to grow faster and experience greater variability
of growth.
Even though ﬁnancial constraints are important for explaining the growth
characteristics of ﬁrms, it is not obvious whether they also have important
aggregate consequences. The main goal of this paper is to show that ﬁ-
nancial constraints that arise because of limited contract enforceability can
have important aggregate consequences. On the one hand it impairs the ef-
ﬁcient allocation of resources with signiﬁcant welfare consequences. On the
other, it increases the sensitivity of the macro economy to the arrival of new
technologies that create better investment opportunities.
We study a general equilibrium model where entrepreneurs and investors
enter into a long-term contractual relationship which is optimal, subject to
enforceability constraints.1 Our model is closely related to the partial equi-
librium model of Marcet and Marimon (1992) with two important diﬀerences.
First, we conduct the analysis in a general equilibrium framework. Second,
we do not assume that repudiation leads to market exclusion. Once the
1This paper relates to the literature on optimal lending contracts with the possibility of
repudiation such as Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Atkeson (1991), Kehoe and Levine (1993)
and Marcet and Marimon (1992). Contributions that explicitly focus on the ﬁnancing of
the ﬁrm are Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997), Monge (2001) and Quintin (2000).
1contract has been signed, the entrepreneur has the ability to start a new in-
vestment project by entering into a new contractual relationship. Therefore,
the value of repudiation is endogenous in our model and it depends on all
the general equilibrium conditions. This is an important diﬀerence respect
to other macro models with endogenous market incompleteness where agents
revert to autarky in case of default. A notable exception is Phelan (1995),
although his analysis is limited to steady states.
Within this framework we show that limited enforceability creates a large
ampliﬁcation mechanism for the macroeconomic impact of new technological
innovations. More speciﬁcally, our theory predicts that economies in which
contracts are less enforceable (either because there is no market exclusion
or the cost of repudiation is higher) display greater volatility of output than
economies with stronger enforceability of contracts.
The mechanism that generates the ampliﬁcation result can be explained
as follows. In each period there are two types of ﬁrms: those that are re-
source constrained (the enforcement constraint is binding) and those that are
unconstrained (the enforcement constraint is not binding). The investment
behavior of the ﬁrst group of ﬁrms is what generates the ampliﬁcation result.
When a more productive technology arrives, the value of a new investment
project increases. Because defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from
the market—that is, they can start a new project by entering into a new
contractual relationship—the higher value of a new project makes the re-
pudiation option more attractive. To prevent repudiation, the value of the
contract for the entrepreneur must increase. By increasing this value, the
tightness of the incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed and more capi-
tal is given to the ﬁrm. Notice that this mechanism depends crucially on the
assumption that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.
With market exclusion—which we interpret as a higher degree of contract
enforcement—the investment boom of constrained ﬁrms would not arise and
the economy would display lower aggregate volatility.
The result that countries with lower enforceability of contracts display
greater aggregate volatility is consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 1.
This ﬁgure relates the standard deviation of per-capita GDP growth to an
index of contract enforceability for a cross-section of countries. This index
is compiled by Business Environmental Risk Intelligence and measures “the
relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and the degree of
complications presented by language and mentality diﬀerences”. (See Knack
and Keefer (1995)). It takes a value between 0 and 4, with higher scores for
2superior quality. The data is the average over the period 1980-95 as reported
in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (2001) and it is available for 44 countries. The
standard deviation of growth is computed using data from the World Bank
Statistical Indicators for the period 1980-2001. As can be seen from the
ﬁgure, there is a strong negative association between the aggregate volatility
of a country and the degree of contract enforcement.2 These results are
robust to alternative indexes of contract enforceability as the ones reported
in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003).
Figure 1: Correlation of contract enforcement and aggregate volatility.
Many other authors have studied the possibility that ﬁnancial market
frictions may amplify and propagate shocks to the economy. An important
2The correlation is -0.57. This negative association remains signiﬁcant even if we
take into account the development stage of a country. We regressed our volatility index
(standard deviation of GDP growth) on the log of per-capita GDP and on the log of the
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3contribution is the paper by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).3 The key feature of
this paper is the use of the ﬁrm’s assets to collateralize the loan. Although
collateralized debt is the typical form of ﬁnancing for certain ﬁrms, for other
ﬁrms it is not available simply because their assets are not very valuable
outside the ﬁrm. High tech ﬁrms are an example. For ﬁrms like these the
investors have to rely on direct contractual incentives rather than collateral.
The optimal incentive structure then requires that the repayments to the
investor are state-contingent. The state-contingency nature of the ﬁnancial
contract is one of the features that diﬀerentiates our model from Kiyotaki
and Moore and is crucial to generating the ampliﬁcation result.
Our paper also diﬀers from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) quantitatively,
that is, in the ability to generate large ampliﬁcation of shocks. Kocherlakota
(2000) shows that models with credit constraint mechanisms like that in Kiy-
otaki and Moore cannot generate large ampliﬁcation for realistic parameter
values. A similar conclusion is reached by Cordoba and Ripoll (2002). This
is in contrast to our quantitative results that will be shown in Section 4.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Sections 3 and 4 characterize the optimal contract and deﬁne the general equi-
librium. Section 5 studies the quantitative properties of the model. Section
6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
Preferences and skills: There are two types of agents: “entrepreneurs”
and “workers”. The mass of entrepreneurs is 1 and of workers is m. Workers










where r is the intertemporal discount rate, ct is consumption, lt are working
hours and ϕ(lt) is the disutility from working with ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ0(l) > 0,
ϕ00(l) > 0. Given wt the wage rate, the supply of labor is determined by the
condition ϕ0(lt) = wt.
The life span of entrepreneurs is uncertain as they die with probability
α. New entrepreneurs are born in every period so that the mass of active
3Other recent contributions are Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997), DenHaan, Ramey and Watson (1998), Smith and Wang (1999)








Entrepreneurs have the same intertemporal discount rate as workers but they
discount future consumption more heavily due to the uncertain survival. The
assumption of stochastic death allows us to structure the model so that new
ﬁrms are started only by newborn entrepreneurs. This simpliﬁes the analysis
because we do not need to keep track of the whole distribution of assets
among potential entrants.
Technology and shocks: Entrepreneurs have the managerial ability to
run an investment project. A project requires a initial ﬁxed set-up invest-
ment I0, which is sunk. After the initial set-up investment, it generates the
gross revenue F(z;k,l) = z · f(k,l). The variables k and l are the inputs
of capital and labor, and z is the project-speciﬁc productivity parameter.
The function f is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave and
satisﬁes f(k,0) = f(0,l) = 0. The input of capital is chosen one period in
advance and depreciates at rate δ.
The productivity parameter z is project-speciﬁc, and therefore, it remains
constant for a particular project. There are two types of projects: low pro-
ductivity projects with z = zL and high productivity projects with z = zH,
where zL < zH. If a ﬁrm wants to get a diﬀerent z, it has to invest in a
new project. But this implies the loss of the previous set-up investment I0.
Therefore, if the diﬀerence between zL and zH is not too large, the replace-
ment of an active project is never eﬃcient. Throughout this paper we assume
that this diﬀerence is suﬃciently small that the net gain from replacing a zL
project with a zH project is always smaller than the set-up investment I0.
This assumption will be convenient for the subsequent characterization of
the optimal contract.
Before committing to the set-up investment I0, high productivity projects
are always preferable to low productivity projects. However, they are avail-
able in limited supply. We denote by Nt the number of high productivity
projects that can be started in period t. Given St the number of search-
ing entrepreneurs, the probability of ﬁnding a high productivity project is
pt = min{Nt/St,1}.
The arrival of a new technology creates better investment opportunities
by increasing Nt. In this economy expansions are driven by the arrival of
5more productive projects rather than the improvement of existing ones. In
this sense, the economy has the typical features of a model with vintage
capital.4 The variable Nt follows some stochastic process with probability
distribution Γ(Nt+1,Nt). In the simulation section we will consider several
speciﬁcations of this function.
Entrepreneurial skills fully depreciate if the entrepreneur remains inac-
tive. This implies that, as long as the net present value of a new project is
positive, newborn entrepreneurs always undertake a project, even if they were
unable to ﬁnd a high productivity project. This assumption eliminates the
possibility that entrepreneurs remain inactive and wait for better investment
opportunities. At the same time, by undertaking a project, an entrepreneur
maintains the ability to start new projects in future periods.
Financial contract and repudiation: Entrepreneurs ﬁnance the invest-
ment projects by signing long-term contracts with a ﬁnancial intermediary.
Contracts are not fully enforceable. In case of repudiation the entrepreneur
can divert the capital kt−1 invested in the pervious period. Diversion gener-
ates a private beneﬁt which is equal to the amount of capital diverted. In
addition, he can also start a new project by entering into a new contractual
relationship. The diverted capital, however, cannot be reinvested in the new
project and repudiation also carries with it a cost κ.5
Denote by V (st) the value of searching for a new project for the en-
trepreneur, where st denotes the aggregate states of the economy at time t.
This function is endogenous in the model and will be derived in Section 4.
For the moment, however, let’s assume that this function is exogenous and
known. The value of repudiating an active contract is:
D(kt−1,st) = kt−1 + V (st) − κ (3)
The repudiation value has three components: (i) the value of diverting the
capital invested in the previous period, kt−1; (ii) the external value of search-
ing for a new project, V (st); (iii) the repudiation cost, κ. The ﬁrst and
4The model is a parsimonious representation of a more complex environment in which
there is persistent growth. Once we interpret the model as a detrended version of a model
with persistent growth, a fall in Nt does not necessarily imply a fall in the economy-wide
productivity but only lower growth.
5Allowing for the reinvestment of the diverted capital would complicate the analysis
because the value of searching for a new project would depend on this capital.
6second components are especially important for our results. As we will see
later in the paper, without the ﬁrst component all ﬁrms will operate at the
optimal scale and the possibility of repudiation would play no role in the
transmission of shocks. Without the second component, which corresponds
to the case of market exclusion, the investment of constrained ﬁrms will not
be very sensitive to shocks and we would not have the ampliﬁcation result.
The third component, i.e. the repudiation cost, is introduced to insure that
the participation constraint for the ﬁnancial intermediary is satisﬁed: in the
absence of this cost, the repudiation value might be so large that the ﬁnan-
cial intermediary does not break even for any initial value of k. Finally, we
should observe that the case of full enforceability is simply the case in which
D(kt−1,st) = 0.
Timing summary: Before continuing, it is useful to summarize the tim-
ing of the model. When a new entrepreneur is born, he searches for a high
productivity project. Given the found project—characterized by the produc-
tivity parameter z—he will sign a long-term contract with a ﬁnancial inter-
mediary. The contract provides the funds for the initial set-up investment I0
and the initial variable capital kt. At the beginning of the next period then,
conditional on survival, the entrepreneur observes Nt+1 and decides whether
to repudiate the contract and search for a new investment project. In case
of repudiation the old project is permanently lost. If instead the contract is
not repudiated, the ﬁrm hires labor and production takes place. The rev-
enues from production, net of the labor cost, are used to make payments to
the entrepreneur, the ﬁnancial intermediary and to ﬁnance the new variable
capital kt+1.
The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts: For the analysis that follows it is conve-
nient to deﬁne the discounted expected net proﬁts generated by the period t
investment. These proﬁts are given by:




α · kt + (1 − α) ·
h




At the end of period t, the ﬁrm invests kt, which is a cost, and in the next
period it recovers a value which is conditional on survival. If the ﬁrm is
liquidated, which happens with probability α, the liquidation value is kt. If
7the ﬁrm is not liquidated, production takes place and the value is (1−δ)kt+
F(z;kt,lt+1) − wt+1lt+1.
3 The optimal ﬁnancial contract
Assuming competition in ﬁnancial markets, the optimal contract maximizes
the expected discounted payments to the entrepreneur (the entrepreneur’s
value) subject to the enforcement constraints and the initial participation
constraint for the intermediary. Consider a new contract signed at time t by
an entrepreneur with a project of quality z. Denoting by dτ the payments
received by the entrepreneur at time τ ≥ t, the contractual problem is:























dτ ≥ 0 (8)
Notice that the entrepreneur’s payments are discounted by β = (1 −
α)/(1 + r)—rather than 1/(1 + r)—because the entrepreneur (and the ﬁrm)
survives to the next period with probability 1 − α.
Equation (6) is the enforcement constraint: at any future date, the value
of continuing the contract for the entrepreneur cannot be smaller than the
value of repudiating it, after the realization of the shock. The default value
has been deﬁned in equation (3). For the moment we take this function as
given. We will derive it in Section 4.
Equation (7) is the participation constraint for the intermediary. This
constraint imposes that the discounted expected value of payments received
by the intermediary cannot be smaller than the set-up investment. The
expected payment is π(z;kτ,lτ+1,wτ+1)−dτ, that is, the expected discounted
net proﬁts minus the payment to the entrepreneur.
The last constraint (8) imposes the non-negativity of payments to the
entrepreneur. This is justiﬁed by the non-negativity of consumption given
8that in equilibrium the entrepreneur does not own any assets outside the
ﬁrm. The entrepreneur is not precluded from accumulating external assets.
However, the outside investment never dominates the investment in the ﬁrm.
It is important to point out that in formulating the problem above we
have assumed that the intermediary commits to fulﬁll any obligation, that
is, there is one-sided commitment. However, in all parameterizations used
in this paper, the assumption of one-side commitment is irrelevant because
the value of the contract for the intermediary, after investment, is always
non-negative. We will show this in Section 5.2.
3.1 Recursive formulation
After writing the above problem in Lagrangian form with γτ+1 the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint (6) and λt
the Lagrange multiplier for the participation constraint (7), the contractual

















µτ+1 = µτ + γτ+1/λt (10)
dτ ≥ 0, µt = 1/λt (11)
The formal derivation of the saddle-point formulation is provided in Ap-
pendix A.1. By Theorem 1 in Marcet and Marimon (1997), a solution to the
saddle point problem is a solution to the original problem. Of particular in-
terest is the co-state variable µ that evolves according to µτ+1 = µτ +γτ+1/λt
for all τ ≥ t. This variable increases when the Lagrange multiplier γτ+1 is
positive, that is, when the enforcement constraint (6) is binding, until it
reaches the value of 1.
Notice that µτ cannot be greater than 1. Otherwise, the objective (9)
would be optimized by choosing inﬁnitely large values of dτ. But this would
violate the participation constraint for the intermediary. Therefore, the max-
imum initial value of the costate is µt = 1. In this case the contract simply
9maximizes the unconstrained expected discounted value of proﬁts. However,
if the participation constraint for the intermediary is tighter, then µt must
be smaller than 1. As we will see in the next section, this implies that the
investment of the ﬁrm is initially constrained.
















d ≥ 0, µ(s
0) ≥ µ (13)
s
0 ∼ H(s) (14)
where the prime denotes the next period variable and H(s) is the distribution
function for the next period aggregate states (law of motion). The aggregate
states are given by the number of new investment projects with high pro-
ductivity, N, and by the distribution (measure) of ﬁrms over the variables z
and µ, which we denote by M(z,µ). Therefore, s = (N,M). Notice that
the choice of the next period µ is state contingent.
Before continuing, it would be useful to emphasize the connection between
the original problem (5) and the recursive formulation (12). The recursive
problem is equivalent to the original problem if µt = 1/λt, where λt is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint for the inter-
mediary (Equation (7)). Operationally, the initial µt—and therefore λt—is
determined as the value that maximizes the value of the contract for the en-
trepreneur subject to the participation constraint for the intermediary. The
values of the contract for the entrepreneur and the intermediary can be easily
computed once we have characterized the optimal contract. The two contract
values are simply the expected discounted payments that the entrepreneur
and the intermediary will receive from the contract, which in turn depend
on the initial state µt.
103.2 Characterization of the optimal contract
Conditional on the survival of the ﬁrm, the solution to the optimal contract
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d + βED(k,s0), if µ(s0) > µ
d + βEWµ(z;s0,µ), if µ(s0) = µ
(19)
Condition (15) is simply the enforcement constraint for which the re-
pudiation value D(k,s0) cannot be larger than the contract value for the
entrepreneur Wµ(z;s0,µ(s0)). To show that Wµ(z;s0,µ(s0)) is the value of
the contract for the entrepreneur, consider the case in which µ(s0) > µ.
In this case condition (15) is satisﬁed with equality, that is, D(k,s0) =
Wµ(z;s0,µ(s0)). If we use this equation to eliminate D(k,s0) in the enve-
lope condition (19) we get:
Wµ(z;s,µ) = d + βEWµ(z;s
0,µ(s
0)) (20)
This is a recursive formulation with the current ﬂow return equal to the
entrepreneur’s payment. Therefore, Wµ(z;s,µ) is the value of the contract
for the entrepreneur given the state µ (and the aggregate state s).
Condition (16) tells us that the entrepreneur receives zero payments until
the state µ reaches the value of 1. Conditions (17) and (18) determine the
inputs of capital and labor. While the input of labor is always at the opti-
mal level, that is, the marginal revenue is equalized to zero (see condition
(18)), the input of capital may be smaller than the optimal level if the term
E(µ(s0) − µ) is positive (see condition (17)). This will be the case if µ < 1.
11Life-time dynamics of the ﬁrm: The dynamics of a ﬁrm—characterized
by conditions (15)-(18)—can be described as follows. Consider a new ﬁrm
created at time t. This ﬁrm starts with an initial state µt < 1. This initial
state is such that the participation constraint for the investor—condition
(7) in the original problem—is satisﬁed. More speciﬁcally, the initial state
will be the maximum value of µt such that the value of the contract for the
intermediary is equal to I0. Over time, the value of µ increases in those
contingencies for which the enforcement constraint is binding until it reaches
1. Before that, the entrepreneur receives zero payments and operates at a
sub-optimal scale, that is, the marginal revenue from capital, πk, is greater
than zero. Once µ reaches the value of 1, the input of capital is kept at
the optimal level and the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained. At this point
the entrepreneur starts receiving payments. However, only the expected
lifetime payments are determined. Due to the linearity of preferences, the
entrepreneur is indiﬀerent on the time allocation of consumption.
The postponement of the entrepreneur’s payments before the ﬁrm be-
comes unconstrained has a simple intuition. Because the input of capital
is constrained by the entrepreneur’s value (see condition (15)), an increase
in this value relaxes the investment constraints of the ﬁrm. Therefore, it
is optimal to postpone the entrepreneur’s payments in order to relax these
constraints.6
When contracts are fully enforceable, new ﬁrms will start with µ = 1
and operate at the optimal scale from the beginning. In fact, because the
enforceability constraint never binds, the initial µ remains constant, that is,
µ(s0) = µ = 1/λt. This implies that E(µ(s0) − µ) = 0 and (17) becomes
πk(z;k,l0,w0) = 0. Condition (16) then implies that the initial µ must be
equal to 1, otherwise the entrepreneur will never receive any payment. We
summarize the dynamic properties of a ﬁrm as follows:
Firm’s dynamics: When contracts are fully enforceable, all ﬁrms operate
at the optimal scale ¯ k(z;s). With limited enforceability, however, ﬁrms are
initially small and grow on average until they reach the optimal scale. Before
reaching the optimal scale the entrepreneur’s payments (and consumption)
6This property derives from the assumption of risk neutrality and is common to models
with ﬁnancial market frictions such as Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997), Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) and Quadrini (1999). With risk averse agents, as in Marcet and Marimon
(1992), d could be positive also in the constrained status. However, the motive for con-
sumption smoothing does not completely eliminate the incentive for higher savings. See
Cagetti and De Nardi (2002) and Quadrini (2000).
12are zero. At each point in time the economy is then characterized by two
types of ﬁrms: constrained young ﬁrms and unconstrained old ﬁrms.
At the micro level, the properties of the model are similar to the properties
of the partial equilibrium model of Marcet and Marimon (1992). At the
aggregate level, however, our results are new as we will see in Section 5.
4 Repudiation value and general equilibrium
Until this point we have taken as given the repudiation function D(k−1,s) =
k−1 + V (s) − κ, where k−1 denotes the capital chosen in the previous period
and available in the current period. Although the capital input is chosen
within the contract, the value of searching for a new project V (s) is endoge-
nous and depends on all the general equilibrium conditions. This function
results from:
V (s) = (1 − p) · V (zL;s) + p · V (zH;s) (21)
The variable p = min{N/S,1} is the probability of ﬁnding the high produc-
tivity project which depends on the availability of these projects, N, and
on the number of searching entrepreneurs, S. Because in equilibrium only
newborn entrepreneurs will search for a high productive project, the number
of searchers is S = α. The function V (z;s) is the value of a new investment
project with productivity z as deﬁned in (5).
To solve for the equilibrium we have to solve a non-trivial ﬁxed point
problem. In general we can think of this ﬁxed point as the solution to a





j(s) the function that determines the values of searching for new
projects in all future periods, T returns the value of searching for a new
project today V
j+1(s). The deﬁnition of a general equilibrium follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilib-
rium is deﬁned as a set of functions for (i) labor supply l(s) and consumption
c(s) from workers; (ii) contract policies d(z;s,µ), k(z;s,µ) and µ(z;s,µ,s0);
(iii) initial contract state µ0(z;s); (iv) value of searching V (s) (v) wage w(s);
(vi) law of motion for the states s0 ∼ H(s); and (vii) mapping T. Such that:
13(i) the consumption and labor supply from workers are optimal; (ii) the con-
tract policies satisfy the optimality conditions (15)-(18); (iii) the initial state
µ0(z;s) is such that the intermediary breaks even; (vi) the wage clears the
labor market; (v) the capital market clears (investment equals savings); (vi)
the function H(s) is consistent with individual decisions and the shock; (vii)
the searching value V (s) is the ﬁxed point of T.
Proving the existence of an equilibrium requires the proof of the existence
of a ﬁxed point in (22). This is a diﬃcult task because V (s) is a function of
the whole distribution of ﬁrms. However, the existence and uniqueness of a
steady state equilibrium can be easily established. This is formally stated in
the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that zL = zH. Then there exists a unique steady-
state equilibrium characterized by an invariant distribution of ﬁrms and con-
stant values of V (s) and w(s).
Proof 4.1 Appendix A.2.
5 Contrasting economies with and without contract enforceability
In this section we study the properties of the model using a parameterized
version of the model. Section 5.1 describes the parameterization and Section
5.2 shows some of the dynamic properties of an individual ﬁrm in the steady
state equilibrium. Section 5.3 studies the response of the aggregate economy
to shocks and Section 5.4 quantiﬁes the welfare losses associated with limited
contract enforceability.
5.1 Parameterization
We calibrate the economy using steady state values for the deterministic
version of the economy with zL = zH = ¯ z. The period in the economy is one
year and the intertemporal discount rate, which is equal to the interest rate,
is set to r = 0.04. The disutility from working takes the form ϕ(l) = A·l
1+
 ,
where  is the elasticity of labor. In the baseline model we set  = 1 which is
the value often used in business cycle studies. We will also report the results
14for alternative values of . The parameter A is chosen so that one third of
available time is spent working.
The mass of workers m coincides with the average employment size of
ﬁrms because the mass of entrepreneurs is 1. Given that the parameter A is
chosen so that l = 0.33, higher values of m imply lower values of the wage
rate but do not aﬀect the properties of the model.
The death probability of entrepreneurs, which in the model corresponds
to the exit rate of ﬁrms, is set to α = 0.05. This is consistent with the
numbers reported in industry dynamics studies such as Evans (1987).7
The production function is speciﬁed as z · (kνl1−ν)θ. Based on the dis-
cussion in Atkeson, Khan and Ohanian (1996) we set θ = 0.85. This is also
the value used by Atkeson and Kehoe (2001). After ﬁxing θ, the parameter
ν is set so that the labor income share of unconstrained ﬁrms is 0.6. For
unconstrained ﬁrms the labor share is equal to θ(1 − ν). Given θ = 0.85,
this implies a value of ν = 0.294. Because in the economy there are also
constrained ﬁrms, the economy-wide labor share is not exactly 0.6. However,
because a large portion of aggregate production is generated by unconstrained
ﬁrms, the economy-wide share of labor income is not very diﬀerent from 0.6.
A similar idea is used to calibrate δ. Using the ﬁrst order condition for the
optimal input of capital πk = 0 (which is satisﬁed for unconstrained ﬁrms),
the depreciation rate can be expressed as δ = θν
K/Y − r
1−α. With a capital-
output ratio of 2.5 and the values of the other parameters chosen above, we
get δ = 0.0579. The value of ¯ z is chosen such that the input of capital of
unconstrained ﬁrms is equal to 1. This is just a normalization.
Given the parameterization of the production sector, the model generates
a stationary distribution of ﬁrms. The initial set-up investment I0 and the
repudiation cost κ aﬀect the initial size of new ﬁrms which in turn aﬀects
the fraction of ﬁrms that are constrained. More speciﬁcally, when I0 is large
and κ is small, the initial size of new ﬁrms is smaller and the fraction of con-
strained ﬁrms larger. We parameterize I0 and κ so that in the steady state
40 percent of ﬁrms are constrained. Although there are not direct indicators
of how many ﬁrms ﬁnd their investment plans constrained by ﬁnancial con-
siderations, the 40 percent target seems reasonable. The sensitivity analysis
will then show how the magnitude of the ampliﬁcation result is aﬀected by
7The entrepreneurs’ death should not be interpreted only as biological death. It also
includes the loss of entrepreneurial skills. Once we assign this broader interpretation, the
5 percent probability is not unreasonable.
15the choice of this particular parameterization target.
Notice that the parameterization target for the number of constrained
ﬁrms can be reached with diﬀerent combinations of I0 and κ. However,
the particular choice of these two parameters do not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the
quantitative results as long as they lead to the same fraction of constrained
ﬁrms. We assume I0 = 0.2 and κ = 0.35. This implies that the set up and
repudiation costs are 20 and 35 percent the value of variable capital used by
unconstrained ﬁrms (which we have normalized to 1). These values can be
considered a compromise given the constraints we face in the choice of these
two parameters.8
The last part of the model that need to be parameterized is the produc-
tivity diﬀerential between low and high projects—that is, zL and zH—and
the probability distribution for the arrival of high productivity projects N.
This will depend on the particular exercise we conduct when we study the
response of the aggregate economy to the arrival of a new technology. We
will choose these parameters in Section 5.3 when we describe these exercises.
The full set of parameter values are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values.
Intertemporal discount rate r = 0.04
Disutility from working ϕ(l) ≡ A · l
1+
 A = 0.001,  = 1
Death probability of entrepreneurs α = 0.05
Production technology ¯ z · (kνl1−ν)θ ¯ z = 0.012, θ = 0.85, ν = 0.294
Depreciation rate δ = 0.0579
Set-up investment I0 = 0.2
Cost of repudiation κ = 0.35
5.2 Steady state properties
Before studying the response of the economy to the arrival of new technolo-
gies, it is instructive to examine some features of the optimal contract when
8If I0 is too small, active ﬁrms with low productivity projects would always ﬁnd conve-
nient to replace them with high productivity projects. If I0 is too large, low productivity
projects would never be implemented. If κ is too small, then there would not be an op-
timal contract that satisﬁes the participation constraint of the intermediary (zero proﬁt
condition). If κ is too large, contracts would be fully enforceable.
16there is no aggregate uncertainty (zL = zH = ¯ z) and the economy is in the
steady state equilibrium. These properties will be helpful for understanding
the behavior of the economy when there is aggregate uncertainty.
A new ﬁrm starts with an initial µ < 1. In the steady state equilibrium
the next period value of µ is always greater than the current value until
it reaches 1. Therefore, equation (15) is satisﬁed with equality. Using the
envelope condition (19) to eliminate Wµ and taking into account that for
µ0 < 1 the entrepreneur’s payments d are zero (see condition (16)), condition
(15) can be written as D(k) = βD(k0). We have omitted z and s as explicit
arguments of the repudiation function because in the steady state they are
constant. Finally, remembering that D(k) = k +V −κ, where V is constant
in the steady state, we have:
k + V − κ = β

k
0 + V − κ

(23)
Given the initial capital kt associated with the initial µt, equation (23) de-
termines the whole life-time path of capital. This path is such that the ﬁrm
starts small and grows over time until it reaches the unconstrained status
with ¯ k. Because in every period there is entry by new ﬁrms and exit of some
incumbents, the size distribution of ﬁrms will be non-degenerate. This is in
contrast to the case in which contracts are fully enforceable where all ﬁrms
operate at the optimal scale from the beginning.
The invariant (steady state) distribution for the economy with full and
limited enforceability are plotted in Figure 2. The hight of each bar corre-
sponds to the fraction of ﬁrms operating with a speciﬁc input of capital (ﬁrm
size). In the case of limited enforceability (plot b), each size class of ﬁrms
corresponds to a particular age class with the last class including all ﬁrms
older than the number of years necessary to reach the unconstrained status.
For this parameterization, ﬁrms reach the unconstrained status in 10 years.
In the steady state distribution, 40 percent of ﬁrms are constrained, they use
29 percent of aggregate capital and they produce 33 percent of aggregate out-
put. Notice that the size of ﬁrms in the economy with enforceable contracts
is smaller than the size of unconstrained ﬁrms in the economy with limited
enforceability. This is because, for each wage rate, the aggregate demand of
labor is smaller when contracts are not enforceable. In equilibrium, then, the
wage rate is smaller and the optimal size of unconstrained ﬁrms is larger.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 3 plots the values of a new contract for the
entrepreneur and the intermediary as a function of capital. These are the
17Figure 2: Steady state distribution of ﬁrms.
values E
P∞
τ=t βτ−tdτ and E
P∞
τ=t βτ−t[π(z;kτ,lτ+1,wτ+1) − dτ]. As can be
seen from the ﬁgure, the entrepreneur’s value increases with k while the
value for the intermediary decreases with k. The assumption of competition
in ﬁnancial markets then implies that the initial value of the contract for
the intermediary is equal to the set-up investment I0 = 0.2, that is, the
participation constraint for the investor imposed in problem (5) is binding.
New ﬁrms start with an input of capital that is 39 percent smaller than
the unconstrained value ¯ k. From Figure 3 we can also see how the set-up
investment aﬀects the initial size of new ﬁrms. When I0 is large, the initial
value of the contract for the intermediary must also be large in order for
the intermediary to cover the cost of this investment. This requires that
the initial size of the ﬁrm is smaller and in aggregate there will be a larger
fraction of constrained ﬁrms.
After the initial entrance of the ﬁrm, the input of capital grows over time
18Figure 3: Steady state contract values.
and the value for the intermediary becomes negative. Notice, however, that
this is the value before capital investment while for the decision to repudiate
the contract what is relevant is the value after capital investment. More
speciﬁcally, the intermediary could repudiate the contract at the beginning
or at the end of the period. The intermediary value at the beginning of
period t (before receiving or making any payment) is:




τ−t[π(z;kτ,lτ+1) − dτ] (24)





τ−t[π(z;kτ,lτ+1) − dτ] (25)
19These two values are plotted in Figure 3. The important point is that these
values are always positive in the baseline model. With aggregate uncertainty
they are aﬀected by the shock but they never become negative. Therefore,
the intermediary will never repudiate the contract.
5.3 Contract enforceability and the diﬀusion of new technologies
In this section we study how the economy responds to the arrival of a new
technology that increases the number of high productivity projects Nt. We
will consider two hypothesis about the persistence of the shock: temporary
and permanent.
Temporary shocks: We ﬁrst consider the case in which Nt is indepen-
dently and identically distributed as a uniform in the interval [0,α], where α
is the mass of newborn entrepreneurs. The expected value of Nt is denoted
by N = α/2. Because in equilibrium only newborn entrepreneurs search
for a high productivity project, that is, St = α, the probability of success
pt = Nt/St is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1].
After simulating the economy for a long sequence of Nt = N, we consider
the arrival of a new technology that increases Nt to 2N = α. This implies
that after a long sequence of pt = 0.5, this probability increases to 1. The
increase in Nt is only for one period and from the next period on it reverts
to its mean value. The economy will then converge to the same equilibrium
before the arrival of the new technology.9 In the simulation we assume that
zL = 0.98¯ z and zH = 1.02¯ z. The chosen productivity diﬀerential implies that
high productivity projects, when operated at the optimal scale, are about
30 percent larger than low productivity projects. With this productivity
diﬀerential active entrepreneurs never search for a new investment project
in equilibrium. We would like to point out that, as long as the productivity
diﬀerential is not too large, our propagation mechanism does not depend on
the volatility of the shock. Therefore, within this limit, the parameterization
of zL and zH is irrelevant for the main points we want to make in this section.
The responses of aggregate output to the arrival of the (temporary) tech-
nology are reported in Figure 4. Three versions of the economy are con-
sidered: (i) full enforceability; (ii) limited enforceability with market ex-
clusion; (iii) limited enforceability without market exclusion. These three
9Although we solve the economy for a particular sequence of Nt, agents solve a stochas-
tic dynamic problem where they expect future values of N to be randomly distributed.
20cases imply diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the repudiation function. In the case
of full enforceability D(k−1,s) = 0. In the case of limited enforceability
with market exclusion D(k−1,s) = k−1 − κ. Without market exclusion
D(k−1,s) = k−1+V (s)−κ. In the case of market exclusion we have changed
the value of κ so that the two versions of the model with limited enforceability
have the same repudiation values in the steady state equilibrium. Therefore,
the two models are indistinguishable in the steady state.10
Figure 4: Output response to a temporary shock.
The ﬁgure shows two important results. First, limited contract enforce-
ability introduces a powerful ampliﬁcation mechanism: at impact, the in-
crease in output is about 6 times bigger than in the economy with full en-
forceability. Second, to generate ampliﬁcation, it is crucial to assume that
there is no market exclusion. In fact, when repudiating entrepreneurs are ex-
cluded from the market, the response of aggregate output is not substantially
diﬀerent from the case of full enforceability.
We have also computed the standard deviation of aggregate output re-
sulting from the simulation of the artiﬁcial economy.11 When contracts are
10Given κ and the steady state value of V in the economy without market exclusion,
the repudiation cost in the economy with market exclusion is set to κ − V .
11After simulating the economy for 700 periods and discarding the ﬁrst 200 data points,
21fully enforceable, the standard deviation is only 0.4 percent the mean value
of output. With limited enforceability and no market exclusion, the stan-
dard deviation is 1.6 percent, that is, four times the value when contracts
are enforceable. However, if we exclude defaulting entrepreneurs from par-
ticipating in the market, this number drops to 0.45 percent, which is close to
the number obtained when contracts are enforceable.
To describe the mechanism that generates ampliﬁcation, let’s describe
ﬁrst how the new technology propagates in the economy with full enforce-
ability. In this economy the expansion of aggregate output derives in part
from the increase in the productivity of old and new ﬁrms and in part from
the increase in employment. The productivity of new ﬁrms increases because
they implement more productive projects. The productivity of old ﬁrms in-
creases because they reduce the scale of production after the wage increase.
The mechanism described above is also present in the economy with lim-
ited enforceability. In this economy, however, aggregate output receives an
additional impulse from the expansion of constrained old ﬁrms. In fact, after
the arrival of the new technology, the repudiation value for entrepreneurs
of constrained ﬁrms increases. To prevent repudiation, the value promised
to the entrepreneur must increase. This relaxes the tightness of the incen-
tive compatibility constraints and more capital can be given to these ﬁrms.
Therefore, the impact of the new technology is to lessen the tightness of the
ﬁnancial constraints.
This mechanism can be easily illustrated using the ﬁrst order condition
(15). For constrained ﬁrms, that is, for ﬁrms with µ−1 < 1, this condition is
approximately equal to:12
k−1 + V (s) − κ = β
h




The new technology increases the searching value V (s) = (1−p)·V (zL;s)+
p·V (zH;s) but, because it is temporary, it will have only a marginal impact
we computed the standard deviation of the logarithm of aggregate output. We repeated
the simulation 50 times and averaged the number obtained in each of the 50 simulations.
12This condition would hold exactly if the incentive-compatibility constraint was always
binding for constrained ﬁrms. This is not a bad approximation because the incentive-
compatibility constraint is only occasionally non-binding. Once we make this assumption,
equation (26) can be derived from (15) after we eliminate Wµ using the envelope condition
(19) and we take into account that for µ0 < 1, the entrepreneur’s payments d are zero (see
condition (16)). Finally, we replace D(k−1,s) with k−1 + V (s) − κ.
22on EV (s0). Therefore, the left-hand-side increases more than the right-hand-
side. Because k−1 is given, the new capital k must increase. Figure 5 also
shows that the ampliﬁcation eﬀect is very persistent. This is because the
shock shifts to the right the whole distribution of constrained ﬁrms. After
the shift, it takes several periods to converge back to the limiting distribution.
This mechanism is absent when there is market exclusion. In this case
equation (26) becomes k−1 − κ ≤ β[k − κ] and the investment of the ﬁrm
before it reaches the unconstrained status is independent of the shock. This
feature diﬀerentiates our model from other general equilibrium models with
endogenous market incompleteness where default takes the form of autarky.
One exception is Phelan (1995), which however considers only steady states.
The economy with market exclusion is an economy with a higher degree
of contract enforceability. In this sense, higher enforcement leads to lower
macroeconomic instability. Another dimension along which we can aﬀect the
degree of contract enforceability is through the repudiation cost κ. In fact,
higher values of this cost reduce the incentive to repudiate, and therefore,
increase the degree of contract enforceability.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to a temporary
shock for diﬀerent values of κ when there is no market exclusion. As shown in
the ﬁgure, higher values of κ reduce the ampliﬁcation eﬀect described above.
Therefore, the lower the degree of contract enforceability and the larger is
the macro impact of new technologies.
The reason a higher value of κ reduces the ampliﬁcation eﬀect is because
in equilibrium the fraction of constrained ﬁrms is smaller and on average
they are closer to the unconstrained status. This in turn derives from the
fact that the initial size of new ﬁrms is larger when κ is bigger. As a result of
this, ﬁrms reach the unconstrained status faster and in each period there is a
smaller fraction of constrained ﬁrms. Because the ampliﬁcation eﬀect derives
from the reaction of constrained ﬁrms, smaller is their fraction and smaller
is the impact of the shock on aggregate output. In the limiting equilibrium
of the baseline economy, about 40 percent of ﬁrms are constrained. With the
higher value of κ = 0.60, only 30 percent are constrained.
The second panel of Figure 5 reports the impulse responses for alterna-
tive values of the elasticity of labor . When the supply of labor is rigid
(low values of ), the shock has a smaller impact on aggregate output. This
is because the expansion of constrained ﬁrms is compensated by the con-
traction of unconstrained ﬁrms in response to a larger increase in the wage
23Figure 5: Sensitivity to repudiation cost and labor elasticity.
rate. However, the elasticity of labor aﬀects the magnitude of the output
response not only in the economy with limited enforceability but also in the
full enforcement economy. Therefore, the magniﬁcation factor is in general
independent from the elasticity of labor.
Permanent shocks: The above results are based on the assumption that
the new technology increases the number of high productive projects only
temporarily. A diﬀerent way to think about the arrival of a new technology
is when it increases the productivity of all new projects. We can think of
this type of innovations as generated by new general purpose technologies.
Suppose that the economy has been in the state N = 0 for a long period
of time. Then, unexpectedly, there is the arrival of a new technology which
24increases N to α permanently and all projects implemented during and af-
ter that period will have high productivity. Figure 6 plots the response of
aggregate output for the economies with full and limited contract enforce-
ability (without market exclusion). The two values of z are as in the case of
a temporary shock, that is, zL = 0.98¯ z and zH = 1.02¯ z.13
Figure 6: Output response to a permanent shock.
With limited enforceability the convergence to the higher long-run level
of output is slower. Therefore, limited enforceability delays the diﬀusion of
this type of technologies and there is no ampliﬁcation. To see why the impact
of this type of innovation is not ampliﬁed, consider again equation (26). This
equation describes the investment behavior of constrained ﬁrms, which are
the source of the ampliﬁcation result shown above. As in the previous case,
the new technology increases V (s). The diﬀerence, however, is that now the
term EV (s0) also increases. Therefore, the increase in the left-hand-side is
mostly compensated by the increase in the right-hand-side. As a result, the
input of capital k increases only modestly.
13Diﬀerently from the experiment conducted in the previous section, we now assume that
agents solve a deterministic problem before and after the arrival of the new technology.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that Nt+1 = Nt + εt+1 where ε is i.i.d., and agents
solve a stochastic problem. This would not change signiﬁcantly the quantitative properties
of the impulse response.
25The delaying eﬀect derives from the dynamics of new ﬁrms. After the
arrival of the new technology, output increases because the new ﬁrms are
more productive. However, the impact on output when contracts are not fully
enforceable will be more gradual because the new ﬁrms are initially small.
As these ﬁrms grow in size, the contribution of their higher productivity to
aggregate output increases. In contrast, when contracts are fully enforceable,
new ﬁrms start with the optimal scale from the beginning.
This result can be considered a possible explanation of why the new
Information Technologies of the 1970s took a long time to display their full
potential on productivity as pointed out in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999).
If we interpret the IT revolution as the permanent arrival of a new technol-
ogy, our theory provides a ﬁnancial explanation for its sluggish diﬀusion.
The ﬁnancial explanation complements the sluggish diﬀusion induced by the
vintage structure of investment projects.
Our theory is also consistent with the empirical evidence about the better
performance of new listed ﬁrms after the IT revolution as shown in Hobijn
and Jovanovic (2001). In our model this feature derives from the vintage
structure and is consistent with the view expressed in the above paper: the
reason new ﬁrms outperformed incumbent ﬁrms is because they were less
dependent on old technologies, and therefore, they were more ﬂexible.
5.4 Welfare consequences of limited contract enforceability
In this ﬁnal section we evaluate the welfare consequences of limited contract
enforceability. In evaluating the welfare consequences we assume that zL =
zH = ¯ z, and therefore, there is no aggregate uncertainty.
We conduct the following experiment. Starting from the steady state of
the economy with limited enforceability, we assume that all contracts become
enforceable (including the existing ones). This unanticipated change brings
the economy to a new equilibrium in which all ﬁrms employ the same input
of capital and labor. The transition takes only one period.
Table 2 reports the welfare gains from the transition to the fully enforce-
ment economy. These gains are computed as the increase in every period
consumption necessary to make all agents indiﬀerent between staying in the
economy with limited enforceability (but with the consumption increase) or
making all contracts fully enforceable (and starting the transition). The table
also reports the changes of some key statistics. For the baseline parameter-
ization, the enforcement of contracts induces an increase in the supply of
26labor of almost 2 percent and an increase in aggregate output of almost 4
percent. The welfare gains are 0.46 percent of consumption.




Average size of ﬁrms (capital) 0.848 0.931
Change in working time 1.82%
Steady state output gain 3.84%
Welfare gain from transition 0.46%
Low repudiation cost, κ = 0.25
Average size of ﬁrms (capital) 0.794 0.902
Change in working time 2.73%
Steady state output gain 5.40%
Welfare gain from transition 0.87%
High repudiation cost, κ = 0.60
Average size of ﬁrms (capital) 0.941 0.978
Change in working time 0.61%
Steady state output gain 1.48%
Welfare gain from transition 0.08%
High elasticity of labor,  = 2.0
Average size of ﬁrms (capital) 0.848 0.942
Change in working time 3.33%
Steady state output gain 4.91%
Welfare gain from transition 0.46%
Low elasticity of labor,  = 0.5
Average size of ﬁrms (capital) 0.848 0.925
Change in working time 0.91%
Steady state output gain 3.15%
Welfare gain from transition 0.46%
Table 2 also reports the macroeconomic and welfare implications for al-
ternative values of the repudiation cost and the elasticity of labor. As can
be seen from the second and third sections, the macroeconomic and welfare
implications are larger when the cost of repudiation is low. This is because
in equilibrium a larger fraction of ﬁrms are constrained. For example, when
κ = 0.25, about 45 percent of ﬁrms are constrained, compared to 40 per-
cent in the baseline economy. When κ = 0.6, only 30 percent of ﬁrms are
constrained and their size is closer to the unconstrained size. In this case
27the welfare gains are small. These welfare implications parallels the results
shown in the previous sections according to which lower repudiation costs
lead to greater aggregate volatility.
We also consider diﬀerent values of the elasticity of labor . The larger
the elasticity of labor and the larger is the eﬀect of contract enforceability
on the macro allocation of resources (labor, capital and output). When the
supply of labor is elastic, the increase in the demand of labor leads to a
modest increase in the wage rate. Consequently, the expansion of previously
constrained ﬁrms is not compensated by the contraction of unconstrained
ﬁrms (after the wage increase). However, independently of the value of ,
the welfare gains are in the order of 0.5 percent of consumption. The reason
the larger increase in output and consumption do not lead to larger welfare
gains is because the expansion requires higher savings in the ﬁrst period of
the transition, which is a cost. The welfare consequences of limited contract
enforceability are also studied in Quintin (2000).
6 Conclusion
We have studied an economy in which entrepreneurs ﬁnance investment by
entering into long-term contracts with ﬁnancial intermediaries. Contracts
are not fully enforceable and the incentive compatibility requirement makes
investment dependent on the repudiation value of the entrepreneur, which is
only binding for small and fast growing ﬁrms.
Limited enforceability has important implications for the macro-economy
in two dimensions. On the one hand it impairs the eﬃcient allocation of
resources with signiﬁcant welfare consequences. On the other it aﬀects the
diﬀusion path of new technologies or aggregate shocks. In particular, we
have shown that limited enforceability creates a powerful ampliﬁcation mech-
anism. This ampliﬁcation mechanism depends on two important features of
the model: the state-contingency nature of the optimal contract and the as-
sumption that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.
The ampliﬁcation result would disappear if ﬁnancial contracts were not state
contingent—as in the case of standard debt contracts—or if repudiation leads
to market exclusion—which is the assumption usually made in macro models
with limited contract enforceability.
We have also shown that limited enforcement can delay the diﬀusion of
certain technologies. This “delay eﬀect” is consistent with historical evi-
dence, not only on the diﬀusion of information technologies—as discussed
28by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999)—but also in other technological revolu-
tions, such as the diﬀusion of steel or electricity (see, for example, Freeman
and Soete (1997)). Diﬀerent factors can help to explain this pattern, such as
the need to develop complementary technologies, the need for a fall in the
price of the new product or simply self-interested resistance to new technol-
ogy (Mokyr (2002, p.220)). In this paper we have provided an additional
and complementary explanation which is based on the existence of ﬁnancial
frictions induced by limited contract enforceability.
An important element of our theory is that new technologies are mainly
adopted by younger ﬁrms facilitated by their greater ﬂexibility. This seems
consistent with the diﬀusion and growth of certain industries in the Unites
States such as the computer industry. For example, Bresnahan and Malerba
(2002) examine how the U.S. has persistently led through the distinct eras
of the computer industry. Most of the growth of the industry was due to the
growth of new and small ﬁrms, not just the incumbent of the ﬁrst era, IBM.
Furthermore, new eras did not represent the disappearance of previous lead-
ers, but the overall growth of the industry. This also seems to be the pattern
in the expansion of information and communication technologies during the
1990s.
The results of the paper suggests several extensions. Because the limited
enforceability of contracts induces a sub-optimal allocation of resources, it
becomes important to understand which policies could change this alloca-
tion. The ﬁrst obvious candidate is the consideration of institutional reforms
leading to greater enforcement of contracts. In the model this could be for-
mally captured by an increase in the repudiation cost κ and/or by making
diﬃcult for repudiating entrepreneurs to sign new contracts. The eﬀect of
these reforms is to increase the initial size of new ﬁrms and in equilibrium
there will be a smaller number of constrained ﬁrms. However, enforceability
also depends on informal institutions that are diﬃcult to change in a short
period of time. Other policies could impact on the cost of implementing a
new project. In the model this is captured by a decrease in the set-up in-
vestment I0. A decrease in this cost would increase the initial size of new
ﬁrms and would reduce the number of constrained ﬁrms. We leave for future
research the study of these and other related issues.
29A Appendix: Analytical proofs
A.1 Derivation of the saddle-point formulation
Consider problem (5). Given γτ+1 the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
enforcement constraint (6) and λt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the










































where ˜ µt = 0 and ˜ µτ+1 = ˜ µτ +γτ+1 for all τ ≥ t. This can be derived by expanding
the double sum in the left-hand-side and rearranging terms.






λtπ(z;kτ,lτ+1,wτ+1) − (λt − 1 − ˜ µτ)dτ − (30)
(˜ µτ+1 − ˜ µτ)βD(z;kτ,sτ+1)

If we divide the Lagrangian by λt and deﬁne the new state µτ = (1 + ˜ µτ)/λt,
we obtain the saddle-point formulation (9). Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of proposition 4.1
We ﬁrst prove two lemmas that will be used in the general proof.
30Lemma A.1 Assume that the wage w is constant and z takes only one value.
Then the mapping T deﬁned in (22) has a unique ﬁxed point V .
Proof A.1 Given the continuity of T, it is suﬃcient to show that this mapping is
monotone decreasing and takes values in a bounded and non-empty set. Consider
V1 < V2. The solution of the optimal contract when V = V2 is also feasible
(although not optimal) when V = V1. In fact, constraint (6) will not be violated
if we replace V = V2 with V = V1. Therefore, the initial value of the contract for
the entrepreneur under V = V1 must be at least as big as the value under V = V2.
Because there is some contingency in which the solution under V = V2 is binding
when V = V2 but it is not binding if we replace V2 with V1, then we can ﬁnd another
contract (or allocation) that is feasible under V = V 1 and increases the value of
the entrepreneur without changing the value of the intermediary. Therefore, the
mapping T is monotone decreasing.
To prove that the mapping takes values in a bounded set we can show that there
are ﬁnite lower and upper bounds to the value of T(V ). For any value V , T(V )
cannot be negative simply because the entrepreneur’s payments cannot be negative.
At the same time it cannot be greater than the surplus of an unconstrained ﬁrm,
otherwise the participation constraint for the intermediary will be violated. The set
of values for the mapping is not empty since T(V ) = 0 is always feasible. This is
obtained by not ﬁnancing new projects. Therefore, T(V ) takes value in a bounded
and non-empty set. Q.E.D.
Lemma A.2 Assume that the wage w and the searching value V are constant.
Then there exists a unique invariant distribution of ﬁrms M.
Proof A.2 The distribution of ﬁrms takes a simple structure. In this determin-
istic environment, ﬁrms start with some µ = µ0 and they reach µ = 1 in a ﬁnite
number of periods T. Therefore, the distribution is characterized by T + 1 groups
or types of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst group includes the newly created ﬁrms. The second
group ﬁrms created one year earlier and so on until group T. The last group T +1
includes ﬁrms created T or more periods earlier. This last group includes all the
ﬁrms with µ = 1, that is, unconstrained ﬁrms. Q.E.D.
According to Lemma A.1, for a constant w there exists a unique ﬁxed point
V and the solution to the contractual problem is well deﬁned. Lemma A.2 then
establishes that there exists a unique invariant distribution of ﬁrms with associated
aggregate demand of labor. If we increase w the demand of labor associated with
31the new invariant distribution must decrease. On the other hand, the supply of
labor—implicitly deﬁned by ϕ0(l) = w—is increasing in w. This implies that there
exists a unique value of w that clears the labor market and deﬁnes the unique
steady state equilibrium. Q.E.D.
B Appendix: Numerical procedure
Steady state: The steps to solve for the steady state equilibrium with zL =
zH = ¯ z are as follows:
1. We guess the wage w (which is constant in the steady state).
2. We guess the value of searching for a new project V (which is also constant
in the steady state).
3. Given w and V , we solve the contract on a grid of points for µ using the ﬁrst
order conditions. Because µ never decreases, the model is solved backward
starting from µ = 1. At µ = 1 we know the stock of capital, which is
determined by the condition πk = 0. Then the whole sequence of capital
at the grid points is determined backward using the equation k + V − κ =
β(k0+V −κ), which is the ﬁrst order condition (15) evaluated at the steady
state. Given the sequence of capital, the grid values of µ are also determined
backward using the equation πk = β(µ0−µ). This is the ﬁrst order condition
(17) evaluated at the steady state.
4. In solving the model we also compute the values of the contract for the
intermediary (which we denote by B(µ)) and the entrepreneur (which we
denote by Wµ(µ)) at each grid point. Values outside the grid are obtained
through linear interpolation.
5. Using the zero proﬁt condition for the intermediary we ﬁnd the initial µ for
a new entrant ﬁrm and the corresponding value for the entrepreneur. If this
value is diﬀerent from the initial guess V , restart the procedure from step 2
until convergence.
6. Given the distribution of ﬁrms (which can be determined without iteration
given that in the steady state µ always increases until it reaches 1), check
the clearing condition in the labor market. Update the wage rate and restart
the procedure from step 1 until the labor market clears.
32Aggregate shocks: For each value of z we form a grid of points for µ. Because
z takes two values we form two grids. The grid points are determined by solving
for the steady state equilibrium in which half of the new ﬁrms have z = zL and the
other half z = zH. The details to solve for the steady state are described above.
For each grid point of µ and for each z, we parameterize three factors: (i) the
expected change in µ, E(µ(s0) − µ); (ii) the expected value of the contract for the
intermediary at the beginning of next period, EB(z;s0,µ(s0)); (iii) the expected
value for the entrepreneur at the beginning of next period, EWµ(z;s0,µ(s0)). Us-
ing the factor E(µ(s0) − µ) we can solve the ﬁrst order condition (17). The other
two factors are used to compute the current value of the contract for the interme-
diary, B(z;s,µ) = π(z;k,l0,w0) − d + βEB(z;s0,µ(s0)), and for the entrepreneur,
Wµ(z;s,µ) = d + EWµ(z;s0,µ(s0)).
At each grid point, the three factors are parameterized with linear functions
of: (i) the number of new projects with high productivity, N; (ii) the mean value
of µ for low productivity ﬁrms,
R
µ M(zL,µ); (iii) the mean value of µ for high
productivity ﬁrms,
R
µ M(zH,µ). The last two variables are proxies for the distri-
bution of ﬁrms. Values of the factors outside the grid points are determined with
linear interpolation. The detailed steps to solve for the equilibrium are as follows:
1. Using a random number generator, we draw a sequence of Nt, t = 1,...,T.
2. We guess the coeﬃcients of the parameterized functions.
3. Given the parameterized functions, we solve the model at each t = 1,...,T.
To solve the model we use the ﬁrst order conditions (15)-(18), the initial
condition for the contract (zero-proﬁt condition for the intermediary), and
the market clearing condition in the labor market. Notice that in computing
the market clearing conditions we use the true distribution of ﬁrms. The
approximation based on the use of some of its moments is only for the
computation of the three parameterized factors at each grid point.
4. Using the data obtained from solving the model at each t = 1,...,T, we
estimate the coeﬃcients of the parameterized functions with regressions as
in Krusell and Smith (1998).
5. The estimates of the coeﬃcients of the parameterized factors are used as
new guesses and the procedure is restarted from step 3 until convergence.
For robustness we have also extended the set of moments used to parameterize
the three factors without relevant changes in our numerical results.
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